There is, indeed, no doubt
that the tension was enormously increased throughout the critical days by
mobilization and rumours of mobilization. The danger was clearly pointed
out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the Austrian Ambassador at
Petrograd to his Government:--
As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of Russian
troops, Count Pourtales [German Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the
Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that
nowadays measures of mobilization would be a highly dangerous form of
diplomatic pressure. For in that event the purely military consideration
of the question by the General Staffs would find expression, and if that
button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out of
control.[8]
On the other hand, it must be remembered that in 1909 Austria had mobilized
against Serbia and Montenegro,[9] and in 1912-13 Russia and Austria had
mobilized against one another without war ensuing in either case. Moreover,
in view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, it is difficult to believe
that a day or two would make the difference between security and ruin to
Germany. However, it is possible that the Kaiser was so advised by his
soldiers, and genuinely believed the country to be in danger.
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