de Bethmann-Hollweg most willingly soothed
himself, without the treacherous _arriere-pensee_ which the Prince von
Buelow perhaps would have had of finishing later on, at an opportune
moment, with the British Navy. Nothing authorizes us to believe that
there was not a basis of sincerity in the language of M. de Jagow when he
expressed to Sir E. Goschen in the course of their last painful interview
his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the
Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then
through Great Britain to get closer to France.[1]
Meantime the considerations I have here laid before the reader, in relation
to this general question of Anglo-German rivalry, are, I submit, all
relevant, and must be taken into fair consideration in forming a judgment.
The facts show clearly that Germany was challenging as well as she could
the British supremacy at sea; that she was determined to become a naval
as well as a military Power; and that her policy was, on the face of it,
a menace to this country; just as the creation on our part of a great
conscript army would have been taken by Germany as a menace to her. The
British Government was bound to make counter-preparations. I, for my own
part, have never disputed it. I have never thought, and do not now think,
that while the European anarchy continues, a single Power can disarm in the
face of the others.
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