What we have to bear in mind, in estimating the meaning of the German
naval policy, is a complex series of motives and conditions: the genuine
need of a navy, and a strong one, to protect trade in the event of war,
and to secure a voice in overseas policy; the genuine fear of an attack by
the Powers of the Entente, an attack to be provoked by British jealousy;
and also that indeterminate ambition of any great Power which may be
influencing the policy of statesmen even while they have not avowed it to
themselves, and which, expressed by men less responsible and less discreet,
becomes part of that "public opinion" of which policy takes account.
[Footnote 1: Published in 1908.]
[Footnote 2: See, e.g., Dawson, "Evolution of Modern Germany," p. 348.]
[Footnote 3: Some of these are cited in Buelow's "Imperial Germany," p. 36.]
[Footnote 4: See "Imperial Germany," pp. 48, 71, English translation.]
11. _Vain Attempts at Harmony_.
It may, however, be reasonably urged that unless the Germans had had
aggressive ambitions they would have agreed to some of the many proposals
made by Great Britain to arrest on both sides the constantly expanding
programmes of naval constructions. It is true that Germany has always
opposed the policy of limiting armaments, whether on land or sea. This is
consonant with that whole militarist view of international politics which,
as I have already indicated, is held in a more extreme and violent form
in Germany than in any other country, but which is the creed of jingoes
and imperialists everywhere.
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