Each
thing or person is surrounded by many others. To them it must fit
itself. Being but a part, its goodness is found in serving that whole
with which it is connected. That is a good oar which suits well the
hands of the rower, the row-lock of the boat, and the resisting water.
The white fur of the polar bear, the tawny hide of the lion, the
camel's hump, giraffe's neck, and the light feet of the antelope, are
all alike good because they adapt these creatures to their special
conditions of existence and thus favor their survival. Nor is there a
different standard for moral man. His actions which are accounted good
are called so because they are those through which he is adapted to
his surroundings, fitted for the society of his fellows, and adjusted
with the best chance of survival to his encompassing physical world.
While I have warm approval for much that appears in such a doctrine, I
think those who accept it may easily overlook certain important
elements of goodness. At best it is a description of extrinsic
goodness, for it separates the object from its environment and makes
the response of the former to an external call the measure of its
worth. Of that inner worth, or intrinsic goodness, where fullness and
adjustment of relations go on within and not without, it says nothing.
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