In no large degree can I induce in them
that goodness of which we talk. Some may come to me in conscious
weakness, desiring to be made better. But this I do not undertake. My
aim is a scientific one. I am an ethical teacher. I want to lead men
to understand what goodness is, and I must leave the more important
work of attracting them to pursue it to preacher and moralist. Still,
indirectly there is moral gain to be had here. One cannot contemplate
long such exalted themes without receiving an impulse, and being
lifted into a region where doing wrong becomes a little strange. When,
too, we reflect how many human ills spring from misunderstanding and
intellectual obscurity, we see that whatever tends to illuminate
mental problems is of large consequence in the practical issues of
life.
In considering what we mean by goodness, we are apt to imagine that
the term applies especially, possibly entirely, to persons. It seems
as if persons alone are entitled to be called good. But a little
reflection shows that this is by no means the case. There are about as
many good things in the world as good persons, and we are obliged to
speak of them about as often. The goodness which we see in things is,
however, far simpler and more easily analyzed than that which appears
in persons. It may accordingly be well in these first two chapters to
say nothing whatever about such goodness as is peculiar to persons,
but to confine our attention to those phases of it which are shared
alike by persons and things.
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